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ABSTRACT
The problem that this thesis addresses is the dilemma
between the centralization of housing activities where
bureaucratic procedures have tended to undermine the national
governments' ability in meeting housing targets and the
decentralization of housing activities at a time when local
authorities are too weak and ineffectual to undertake such
responsibilities. Most local authorities lack the
administrative capacity and technical staff to undertake
housing and shelter responsibilities. In addition, they
usually have a weak revenue base and lack the capacity to
raise revenues making them reliant on central financial
support.
By analyzing the provision of housing in Lusaka, Zambia,
this study aims at identifying the circumstances under which
local governments can effectively produce a shelter programme
for the urban poor and the prerequisite conditions necessary
for them to implement policies. In addition, an attempt is
made at redefining the roles of both central and local
governments in the provision of shelter.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
A large proportion of urban populations in developing
countries live in very poor housing conditions. Although
virtually every person has some form of shelter, a growing
number of the urban poor live in over-crowded conditions,
substandard housing, without secure tenure, and lack adequate
basic services. Most governments in developing countries have
attempted to rectify the situation by first the provision of
low cost housing and later by the various sites and services
and upgrading projects. However, all these solutions could
not keep up with fast urban growth. In almost all developing
countries, the supply of housing, both private and public, has
not kept up with demand.
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:
In most developing countries, public provision of housing
and shelter is a responsibility of central agencies. When
governments first realized the need for intervention in
housing, they, in most cases, created ministries of housing
charged with the formulation of national housing policies.
These ministries usually coordinated housing programmes rather
than engaging in actual execution and various agencies were
set up for housing construction, finance, estate management
and so on. However, it was soon realized that the
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proliferation of housing agencies was not conducive to
efficient and effective work because limited responsibilities
tended to create coordination problems. As such many
governments in developing countries moved towards the
centralization of housing activities within one line agency,
usually called the national housing authority. However, the
effectiveness of most of these agencies was not that much
better. It seems that all central bodies, whether
concentrated within one agency or distributed among various
bodies have not been able to meet their targets and there is
currently a tendency towards decentralization and giving local
authorities the responsibility for housing.
The problem that this thesis addresses is the dilemma
between the centralization of housing activities where
bureaucratic procedures have tended to undermine its ability
in meeting housing targets and the decentralization of housing
activities at a time when local authorities are too weak and
inefficient to undertake such responsibilities. Most local
authorities lack the administrative capacity and technical
staff to undertake housing and shelter responsibilities. In
addition, they usually have a weak revenue base and lack the
capacity to raise revenues making them reliant on central
financial support.
1.2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES:
The main purpose of this thesis is to show that neither
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central nor local government alone can be effective in
providing shelter programmes for the urban poor; but rather
initiatives must be taken at both central and local levels.
Central governments, as previously mentioned, are too
centralized; therefore efforts must be made to pass on more
responsibilities to local authorities. To be effective, local
authorities need to build up their institutions so as to
undertake these new responsibilities. As such, the main
objectives of this thesis are:
- to identify the circumstances under which local
governments can effectively produce a shelter
programme for the urban poor and the prerequisite
conditions necessary for them to implement policies.
- to redefine the roles of both central and local
government in the provision of shelter for the urban
poor.
An important issue to keep in mind is that shelter is not
just the provision of a 'house' but rather encompasses a wide
range of activities such as the availability of land, building
materials, infrastructure and services, finance and so on.
Some of these activities are better dealt with at the local
level while others may require strong support and therefore
can better be dealt with at the central level.
Although there may be a number of ways in which the above
objectives may be carried out, the strategy of this thesis is
to concentrate on one case study, i.e.- Lusaka. The Lusaka
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Urban District Council has had a long history in the provision
of housing, and ultimately can be useful in identifying the
obstacles local governments may face if they are to take on
the responsibility of shelter provision. In addition, by
identifying the roles that both central and local government
have played in Lusaka, one can identify their weaknesses and
strengths and can better identify the ideal roles that each
needs to undertake.
1.3 PLAN OF THE THESIS:
In summary, this thesis will attempt to show that for a
shelter programne for the urban poor to be effective
initiatives must be taken at both the local and central levels
and the thesis will use Lusaka as a case study to reach its
objective. Chapter 1, introduces the purposes and objectives
of this study. In addition, it provides a framework for
analysis by providing a background and historical perspective
of shelter provision in Lusaka indicating the government's
performance in meeting housing needs. Chapter 2, focuses on
local-central relations with respect to the provision of
shelter. First a brief overview will be presented to
understand why local government should participate in the
provision of shelter. Then an attempt will be made to examine
the role of the Lusaka Council in the provision of housing,
indicating its strengths and weaknesses, and showing the
constraints it faces in executing an effective shelter
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programn. Chapter 3 identifies the various shelter
components with the aim of understanding who, whether central
of local government, is better suited to act as a facilitator
for the provision of each component. Chapter 4 summarizes and
indicates the inferences that can be drawn from this analysis.
1.4 LUSAKA: BACKGROUND AND URBAN GROWTH:
Prior to independence in 1964, Lusaka was planned as a
'garden city' for Europeans and other non-Africans, while
Africans were not allowed to live in Lusaka unless they were
employed. Africans, considered only temporary workers, were
housed in barracks or were allowed to build huts for
themselves in designated 'compounds' (Schlyter and Schlyter,
1979). Unauthorized housing was not permitted and was
continuously demolished.
The first years of independence marked a period of
economic boom. Copper, the dominant economic activity, was in
demand at the time and its price worldwide was steadily
rising. This was critical to Zambia's economy as copper
resources accounted for 45 percent of government revenue and
about 95 percent of the total foreign exchange earnings. In
the 1970's, however, falling copper prices and increased
military spending caused by conflicts in Zimbabwe, Zaire and
Angola greatly affected Zambia's economy to the point that the
per capita GDP was lower in 1979 than it had been in 1965 or
1972 (Bamberger et al., 1982). This situation has not
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improved in the 1980's as copper remains the country's main
resource and its foreign exchange earnings, accounting to more
than 80 percent of its exports, continues to decline.
At independence, Zambia was one of the most urbanized
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. After independence, rising
copper prices, economic diversification, and the expansion of
government all led to increasing migration to urban areas
particularly Lusaka. In addition, removal of the colonial
restrictions on migration into towns and freedom of movement
allowed workers to bring their families to urban areas.
Also, rural urban income gap and the availability of
employment opportunities in urban areas was another reason for
migration (Bamberger et al., 1982 and Pasteur, 1979).
The Lusaka City Council and the central agencies directed
their activities at the growth of the formal areas of the
city. In addition to the provision of housing, major
infrastructure and social services were provided. In the
housing sector, most of the public resources for housing were
spent on the provision of middle and upper-income housing and
there was a big decline in the provision of housing for
workers. As such, squatter areas grew around Lusaka and the
state's attitude was either to ignore these settlements or to
demolish them (Schlyter, 1984). Table 1 summarizes the total
population of Lusaka between 1963 and 1980 indicating the
proportion living in squatter settlements.
11
Table 1
Changes in Proportion of Population Living
in Self-built Areas of Lusaka 1963-80
Population in Thousands 1963 1969 1973 1980
Total Population 119 262 396 550
Living in unrecognized areas)No. 19 95 166 180
)% (16) (36) (42) (33)
Living in recognized plots )No. 3 21 45 100
)% (3) (8) (11) (18)
Source: Oestereich, 1986a and Pasteur, 1979.
In 1963, the percentage of the population living in
squatter settlements was estimated at between 15-20 percent
(Bamberger et al., 1982, and Schlyter and Schlyter, 1979). As
the provision of housing was not keeping up with population
growth the squatter settlements continued to grow around
Lusaka and by 1974, 42 percent of Lusaka's population were
living in squatter settlements (Bamberger et al., 1982).
At independence, Zambia had two main political parties,
the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and the African
National Congress who between them dominated all the squatter
settlements. In 1972, Zambia became a one-party state and
UNIP eventually took control of most squatter settlements.
The Party is organized hierarchically from national level
down to the household level. It has a sophisticated structure
of elected officials, mass memberships and a two way
communication system between local and central levels
(Pasteur, 1979). At the local level the party is structured
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so that every 50 households form a Section. A number of
Sections make up a Branch of approximately 700 households,
and, several Branches make up a constituency of approximately
6000 households.
Economically, most of the squatters in Lusaka were poor,
but due to economic growth most were employed in the formal
sector and there was very low unemployment at the time
(Pasteur, 1979). However, the decline of copper prices
worldwide led to a decrease in formal sector employment and a
decrease in real wages. In 1979, about 26 percent of urban
households were below the basic needs income of 100 Kwachas
per month (ILO, 1981a). At the same time Lusaka's population
continued to grow, over one half due to natural increase and
the rest due to migration. Table 2 summarizes the increase in
Lusaka's population in relation to the total population.
Oestereich estimated that in 1980, half of Lusaka's
population lived in unplanned settlements and sites and
service areas (this is based on an estimate of 550,000
inhabitants, slightly below the official figure of 599,000).
About 180,000 inhabitants lived in upgraded and sites and
service areas while 100,000 persons (about 18 percent of the
total population) lived in squatter settlements that have yet
to be upgraded (Oestereich, 1986a).
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Table 2
The Growth of Lusaka's Population in Relation
to Total Population in Zambia, 1963 - 1979
Population Lusaka Total Lusaka as % of
Zambia total Zambia
1963 123,000 3,490,000 3.5
1969 262,000 4,057,000 6.5
1974 401,000 4,695,000 8.5
1979 599,000 5,600,000 10.7
Source : Compiled from EIU, 1984 and Martin, 1979.
By the year 2000, Zambia will double its population to
about 12 million people, of which 50-60 percent will be living
in urban areas. The ILO Report estimated that the number of
urban households below the present poverty line would double
or triple by the year 2000 (ILO, 1981a).
1.5 HOUSING POLICIES: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS:
In Zambia, government intervention in housing started at
independence with the adoption of the British colonial policy
of providing housing to its employees. The Zambian
government's aim was to equalize the status of African
employees by giving them the same benefits previously enjoyed
by expatriates. This meant good, high standard housing for
everyone (Bamberger et al., 1982). It also meant that the
state became the major supplier of rental housing. Prior to
independence, private ownership of housing was restricted to
the relatively few high cost dwellings owned by the Europeans,
14
much of which is now owned by the wealthier Zambians (Jol,
1977). After independence, the adoption of the philosophy of
Humanism (President Kuanda's term for his eclectic political
policies) made social and economic equality a political
objective. In the housing sector, it implied that housing was
to be a responsibility of the state while a 'formal' private
market for housing did not develop as it was not encouraged by
the state. For example in 1973, only 18 percent of the total
housing stock in Lusaka was privately owned and was limited to
high and middle income groups (Martin, 1979) .
Prior to independence, the Lusaka City Council like all
other urban councils in Zambia, were responsible for housing
in the designated African areas. At independence, the
colonial practice of authorizing local governments to provide
and maintain public housing stock and its related services was
continued.
In 1965, the government introduced its first sites and
services programme. The idea of sites and services is not new
to Zambia as it was first started by the colonial government
in 1911, albeit on a smaller scale, a practice which continued
off and on until 1963, just prior to independence (NHA, 1975).
The reintroduction of sites and service seems to have started
as an emergency measure to temporarily house squatters who
were displaced under the government's clearance and demolition
schemes, until such a time that more formal housing can be
provided for them (Martin, 1979 and NHA, 1975).
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The provision of sites and service plots and conventional
housing was not keeping up with rapid population growth and
the total number of squatter houses increased from 7,500 in
1965 to 26,300 in 1971. At the same time, only 3,071
conventional houses and 7,850 serviced plots were completed
although the target was 6,790 houses and 14,710 sites and
service plots (Bamberger et al., 1982).
The Second National Development Plan (1972-1976) marked a
change in government policy toward squatter settlements. The
plan recognized that 'although squatter areas are unplanned,
they nevertheless represent assets in both social and
financial terms' (SNDP, 1971:148). It also acknowledged that
its policy of demolition was not a practical solution and
allocated K5 million for squatter improvement out of a total
housing budget of K106 million (approximately 5 percent). The
Plan also recognized that public funds alone were not
sufficient to meet the housing demand. As such, it introduced
a home ownership scheme and councils of large urban areas were
instructed to abandon all new housing construction programmes
for rental use (Greenwood and Howell, 1980 and SNDP, 1971).
However, construction resumed in 1975 as a result of a
temporary policy revision and the scheme was not implemented
(TNDP, 1979). Therefore, actual government investment during
the plan period on public housing, most of which was medium
and high cost dwellings, was estimated at K56.9 million while
only K23.5 million went to sites and service schemes and K1.6
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million for squatter improvement making an increase of over
half the amount originally allocated to public housing and a
decrease of 33 and 68 percent for sites and services and
squatter improvement respectively (Jol, 1977). By the end of
the plan period only 5,000 sites and service plots were
allocated out of the total 67,000 in envisaged the plan (ILO,
1981b). The Third National Development Plan attributed the
unsatisfactory performance in the implementation of housing
policies to 'organizational, financial and legal difficulties
as well as lack of qualified personnel. Implementation was
adversely affected by the uncertain attitude of local
authorities towards the self help policy' (TNDP, 1979: 315).
In the early 1970's, the housing problem in Lusaka grew
to such an extent that the government for the first time felt
compelled to seek external assistance. In 1970, the squatter
settlements comprised 40 percent of the total population in
Lusaka, and it was unlikely that the sites and service schemes
could provide any significant solutions. In addition, these
schemes, although remarkable in their own way, still did not
reach the root of the problem. The sites and service schemes
did not attract a large number of squatters as most of them
could not afford these schemes (Pasteur, 1979). Although
highly subsidized, these plots were only affordable to 50
percent of all urban households (TNDP, 1979). Another factor
that may have had a big influence was the decline of the
copper prices which in 1974 reached its lowest record in the
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international market.
In addition, the bulk of the housing budget continued to
be absorbed in high and medium cost housing. In 1974, 77
percent of the total amount of urban housing went to high and
medium cost housing (including servants quarters), while only
13 percent was spent on low cost units, and 5 percent each for
sites and service plots and informal settlements (Dewar et
al., 1982).
The scale and intensity of the housing problem convinced
the World Bank that a response of equal scale and intensity
was required. In addition, the change of attitude in the
government's perception of squatter settlements, as indicated
in the Second National Development Plan, albeit lacking
substantial implementation strategies, convinced World Bank
economic planners that the Bank's assistance in implementing a
project in Zambia would promote changes in national urban
shelter investment (Bamberger et al., 1982).
Negotiations for the Lusaka Upgrading and Sites and
Services Project (referred to as the Lusaka Project for short)
started in 1973. The Bank loan was approved in July, 1974 and
became effective in April 1975. The project was finally
completed in 1982. The project was to target the poorest 40
percent of the population and comprised the upgrading of
17,000 existing dwellings in four major settlements; provision
of 12,000 sites and service plots; and construction of related
community facilities.
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Total number of beneficiaries was 29,000 families,
although it reached 31,000 families (approximately 180,000
persons) during the implementation stage, comprising between
27-30 percent of the total population of Lusaka (Bamberger et
al., 1982). Half of the sites and service plots were
allocated to low income households and upgrading reached over
90 percent of the households in the targeted areas. The cost
of the houses built under the project was approximately one-
tenth the amount required under conventional schemes. The
project was not subsidized in any way and was to have complete
cost recovery.
The Lusaka Project had one distinct aspect from other
World Bank funded projects at the time which was the high
degree of community participation. The only other project
funded by the World Bank at the time that had community
participation was the first El Salvador Sites and Services
(IBRD, 1983). The Bank having had no previous experience in
community participation was reluctant to accept the idea, but
due to local pressures finally consented on the condition that
it would be terminated if it should unduly interfere with the
timely execution of the project (Bamberger et al., 1982).
The aim of the Lusaka Project, from the World Bank's
point of view, was to demonstrate the feasibility of using
upgrading as a way of providing low cost shelter for Zambia's
urban poor. If the Bank was successful in this respect, then
one would expect a marked change in government policies
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towards the provision of shelter.
The strategy of the Third National Development Plan
(1979-1983) was to 'enable the maximum number of families to
attain, at least, the minimum shelter standards' (TNDP,
1979:321). However, the plan lacks clear implementation
guidelines for carrying out this strategy. On the other hand,
there are a number of merits in the plan in that it adopts
minimum shelter standards, gives priority to low income
groups, proposes the withdrawal of subsidies and rechannelling
them to low income groups, encourages the revision of lending
policies of financial institutions to allow low income groups
better access and establishing a housing bank specifically for
low income housing, promotes home ownership, and finally, it
appoints a Land Development Committee to ensure the
availability of land (TNDP, 1979).
Clearly, if all of the above is implemented, Zambia would
have an outstanding policy for the provision of shelter for
the poor. Unfortunately, very little of what was said in the
text was actually executed.
During the plan period, the emphasis was still on the
construction of housing rather than upgrading. The total sum
spent on upgrading, sites and service schemes, and low cost
housing as a percentage of total public expenditure between
1979 and 1983 was 5,7, and 11 percent respectively. This
amount includes all available public resources for housing
including external loans and grants (TNDP, 1984). Private
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investment in housing has increased during this period,
indicating a change of policy toward private ownership,
although it is still substantially lower than public
investment. Between 1980 and 1984, total private investment
in housing was K88,500 as against a total public expenditure
of K465,000 (TNDP, -1984).
Evidently, the government was relying on external funding
for squatter improvement and upgrading. Unfortunately, the
World Bank was reluctant to give a second loan and therefore,
the government had to seek other donors, with relatively
little success. Lack of donor funding, however, did not
persuade the Zambian government to initiate any upgrading
projects on its own.
In 1980, the West German government provided a small
grant for the upgrading of Kalingalinga, one of the squatter
settlements in Lusaka. The Kalingalinga project, begun in
1980 and completed in early 1987, was the only upgrading
project undertaken by the Council during this period. It is
also the only major upgrading project in all of Zambia,
accounting for 88 percent of total expenditure on upgrading
between 1974 and 1983 (TNDP, 1984). The project was similar
in design to the Lusaka Project and was to provide improved
shelter for 13,000 persons (Oestereich, 1986a). An
interesting feature in the project was more active and intense
community participation. Community participation, as in the
Lusaka Project, was organized by the local party leaders who
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were also given the responsibility for running and maintaining
community facilities.
To sum up, during the Third National Development Plan
period, Kalingalinga was the only upgrading project undertaken
by the Lusaka Council that targeted lower income groups. The
only other investment in housing in Lusaka during this period
was the Helen Kuanda - Phase III, which consisted of the
construction of 100 dwellings for low income families. No new
construction of medium and high cost housing was undertaken in
Lusaka during the plan period (TNDP, 1984).
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Chapter Two
INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP:
CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS
From the last chapter one can see that the provision of
shelter in Lusaka has come to a virtual standstill. This is
due in part to the economic crisis that Zambia is undergoing
at present. High rates of inflation has increased the prices
of building materials both locally produced and imported. In
addition lack of foreign exchange has restricted the import of
building materials on which the construction industry heavily
relies. Also it has restricted the import of primary products
needed for the production of building materials (GTZ, 1983).
Zambia's economic crisis has also decreased the amount of
capital and recurrent grants available for building and
maintaining the publicly owned housing stock. As such, local
councils have had to depend on their own resources which are
often in short supply also. In the meantime, Lusaka's
squatter settlements continue to grow and upgraded areas are
quickly deteriorating due to lack of maintenance.
As such, innovative methods are required to deal with the
shelter issue in Lusaka. In recent years, housing experts
have stressed the need for increased local government
intervention in housing and shelter for the urban poor.
According to these experts, if governments are to have
effective housing policies, then local governments must play a
23
more active role in the planning and implementation of shelter
policies and to consider them within the context of the
planning of urban areas. The main reasons for these views
are:
- Fast urban growth requires regular expansion and
maintenance of urban services. This can be more
efficient if it is a local responsibility.
- Local government is better at understanding local
conditions and needs and can better understand
people's priorities.
- Only local governments of cities can effectively deal
with their own particular housing problems and only
they can innovate new ways of solving their everyday
problems.
- It is only through local government that communities
can voice their concerns and can take a more active
role in issues that effect their well being.
- Local government can be more effective in acting as a
link between local communities and central government.
- A system where funds are mobilized and spent in the
same area is more efficient and responsive to local
needs.
This line of thinking stems from the belief that central
governments have become over-centralized and too bureaucratic,
making them ineffectual in dealing with the shelter problems
of developing countries. Sites and services and upgrading
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projects, for example, have in most instances been carried out
by national agencies without much coordination with the local
authorities, which resulted in implementation and hand-over
problems, and beneficiary acceptance (Allport and von
Einsiedel, 1986). Over-centralization of government activity
has tremendously weakened local governments. In Latin
America, governments are so centralized that they have almost
completely been taken over the role of local governments up to
the point where 'matters intimately related with the daily
life of communities' are decided at the national level
(Hardoy, 1982:12). The main reason for this is the over-
centralization of public expenditure where over 90 percent of
public expenditure is controlled by the central government
leaving less than 10 percent for local governments (Hardoy,
1982).
Given these strong centralization policies, it is not
surprising that local governments are, as very often
criticized, ineffectual and lack adequate administrative and
technical capability to fulfill the demands of urban areas.
They also lack the capacity to raise revenues, although they
generally have the authority to do so.
As such, there is a need for the redefinition of roles
and responsibilities for both central and local governments
with regard to shelter. It should be mentioned that these new
roles and responsibilities cannot be achieved overnight but
must be a gradual process which requires institution building
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and increasing the capacity for local governments to take on
more and more responsibility. Local governments will have to
undertake a multitude of new roles previously carried out by
central governments. However, before assuming these roles,
they must first build up their institutions to be able to
handle these roles by undertaking the following tasks:
- Strengthening their capacity to design, implement, and
monitor local policies and programmes (Schon, 1987).
Local government needs to build its institutional
structure so as to be able to handle this increased
responsibility and to improve its management
capabilities. Managerial skills are very often
lacking in local government and many projects and
programmes have failed or have been delayed because of
managerial ineptitude (Burns and Ferguson, 1987 and
Rondinelli, 1986).
- The second task that local government must undertake
is improving its capacity for raising revenues. Fast
urban growth has led to an increase in local
government responsibility, without a matched increase
in revenues to meet expanding expenditure
requirements. The result is a 'fiscal gap' between
expenditure requirements and resource availability.
Local authorities need to strengthen their ability to
raise revenues by improving their property taxation
systems, imposition of automotive, local income and
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sales taxes, realistic (non subsidized) user and
development charges, and taxes on industry and
commerce, among others (Bahl and Linn, 1984) .
Also, there is often a mismatch between the source of
the revenue and the type of expenditure. For example,
it is assumed that general urban services can be
financed by local taxes, public utilities by user
charges and social services by intergovernmental
transfers. However, very few cities display such a
pattern. Studies show that local taxes have financed
many services that should have been financed from user
charges, or transfers have been used to finance
services that could have been more appropriately
financed from local taxes or user charges (Bahl and
Linn, 1983).
Finally, the tax capacity of local governments needs
to be strengthened by more careful design and
application. For example, property taxes, generally
one of the most important taxes collected by local
governments, have not increased commensurably with the
increase of property values. Inadequate assessment
practices, lack of professional expertise for valuing
properties, and problems of collection and enforcement
are the main obstacles faced by local governments
(Bahl and Linn, 1984).
The aim of this chapter is to see how the above mentioned
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views apply to Lusaka. The intent is to see whether
strengthening the Lusaka Council will ultimately improve
shelter conditions for the poor, or whether there are other
factors that may affect the provision of shelter. In doing so,
a general description of local-central relations will first be
presented. The structure of the Lusaka Urban District Council
and its role in the provision of shelter will then be
discussed; also a review of the Council's revenue raising
capacity is provided. The purpose is to show what role the
Council has played in providing shelter, and what are its
strengths and weaknesses. The role of national shelter
policies and how they affect the provision of shelter is then
discussed.
2.1 CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS: A GENERAL OVERVIEW:
In the context of this paper, local government means the
unit of public administration which administers an urban area,
and often its surrounding rural areas. Central government on
the other hand, refers to all branches of government above the
local level ranging from state or provincial government, to
national governments depending on the country's administrative
system. The powers and roles of local government differ from
country to country depending on the type of colonial
government they previously had (CPFMCG, 1984). Ex-British
colonies, for example, tend to have more or less the same kind
of administrative structure which is different from the
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French, Portuguese, Spanish, or Dutch ex-colonies.
If one has to categorize the types of local government,
two distinct extremes can be made. One extreme are those
local governments that have a high degree of local autonomy
and the other extreme are those that are administrative arms
or offices of central governments. Naturally, most local
governments are somewhere between the two.
The more autonomous local governments usually have an
elected mayor or city-council, have the autonomy to hire their
staff who are paid from local funds, have a strong tax base,
and have more authority to implement local services. The
central government's role in this case, is to provide guidance
in the form of financial incentives and subsidies rather than
regulation.
At the other extreme are local governments that form part
of a highly centralized system where the mayor is usually
appointed centrally and local government is composed of local
branches of central ministries and their staff is usually
appointed centrally as well. In this case, taxation is
centrally regulated and funds for capital development is
passed to central line agencies for implementation. The
central government's role, therefore, is to provide detailed
regulations to local governments (CPFMCG, 1984).
There is also a difference in the way the executive and
deliberative functions of local government are allocated. In
some countries these functions are housed in the same body, in
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others in separate bodies. In countries influenced by the
British system the formulation, authorization, and execution
of policy is the responsibility of the city council who often
exercise these responsibilities through committees or boards.
In other urban areas, such as the United States, France, and
some Latin American countries, the executive and deliberate
functions are entrusted to separate local bodies. A
representative body decides on budgets and other policy
issues, while the executive body is responsible for the
execution of policy. The initiation of policy may be shared
by both. In other countries, a district officer or governor
may be entrusted with both functions. As such, this person,
under the supervision of central government, may exercise all
governmental powers at the local level (UN, 1973).
The effectiveness of local government depends largely on
the degree of decentralization, support from central
government, national policy, and the financial systems within
which it operates. In addition, the division of
responsibilities at the national level between various
ministries can also greatly affect local government
performance. Separate ministries, for example, responsible
for public works, housing and so on, are likely to execute
their programmes themselves rather than through local agencies
(Davey, 1985). Lack of coordination among central ministries
and unclear responsibilities between local, provincial, and
central levels tends to fragment responsibilities creating
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inefficiency and confusion (Bahl and Linn, 1983 and Williams,
1985).
One of the main problems of local government is its weak
revenue base. Local governments in many countries were more
self sufficient in the past but lost some of their best
revenue sources due to the gradual preemption by central
government (Williams, 1985). As such, the present financial
weakness of local government could be attributed to three main
factors:
- Revenue is inadequately shared with local authorities
by central government.
- Weak revenue collection methods from taxation,
charges, and fees, and other means of raising funds.
- Local government's limited access to capital financial
markets for borrowing (UN, 1973).
However there are significant variations from country to
country as the degree of autonomy and the local government's
ability to raise revenues depends on many factors. In the
next section, and attempt will be made to show how the Lusaka
Urban District Council fits into this general context and how
it diverges from it, particularly as it relates to the
provision of shelter.
2.2 THE LUSAKA URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL:
Lusaka is administered by its Urban District Council
which is responsible for the management and maintenance of the
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city and the provision of a number of services such as water
supply, sewerage, roads, and housing. The Council also
undertakes a number of commercial ventures, the biggest being
the liquor operation which brews and distributes beer to local
taverns.
The Council structure is based on the British system of a
mayor and 24 elected councillors, each representing a Ward,
two members appointed by the central government-, and one ex-
officio, the District Secretary. The non-executive mayor is
elected annually by the Council. The management and executive
functions are carried out in various committees. Professional
staff head a number of departments and are responsible to the
Town Clerk. Figure 1 illustrates the organizational structure
of the Council.
The Lusaka Council falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Decentralization which controls the revenue and
expenditure of all councils in Zambia and instructs them on
spending levels and priorities.
The organizational structure of the Lusaka Council has
changed very little since independence. The main changes that
have occurred, apart from the change of name from the Lusaka
City Council to its present name, are the additions of
departments and the formation of the Housing Project Unit.
2. These members were previously appointed by the
Ministry of Local Government and Housing, but with the
disbandment of this ministry, it is likely that these members
are appointed by the Ministry of Decentralization.
32
Figure 1: Structure of the Lusaka Urban District Council
Central-local relations, on the other hand, have
undergone various changes since the time of independence and
there has been considerable encroachment upon local government
autonomy and a general tendency toward centralization
(Greenwood and Howell, 1980). Some decentralization policies
have been introduced in Zambia as far back as 1968 but they
have generally tended to be directed towards the provincial
and district administrations with the aim of encouraging rural
development. It was not until 1980 that a change in the
direction of decentralization policies has directly affected
the Lusaka Council. Under the Local Administration Act of
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1980, the administrative framework and legal status of the
Council was changed, but how effective this act has been on
the decision making process of the Council cannot be
determined at the present time. The decentralization
programme has faced considerable delays due to shortage of
finance available to councils and unsatisfactory financial
management by most.
Central-local relations can best be described by
following the changes that have occurred with respect to the
provision of shelter. This relationship can be divided into
the three phases: the first phase being imediately after
independence where the Lusaka Council had a relative degree of
autonomy. The second phase in the 1970's which was
characterized by strong central interference, and finally the
present period, where an attempt is being made to reallocate
responsibilities to the local authorities.
2.2.1 PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER INDEPENDENCE:
As previously mentioned, at independence the Lusaka City
Council (as it was then called) was responsible for the
provision and maintenance of its housing stock. Should the
Council want to undertake a new housing project, it would
first identify the source of funding, whether governmental,
parastatal or private, and prepare the design of the scheme.
Official approval is then sought from both the Ministry of
Local Government and Housing and the National Housing
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Authority. The National Housing Authority's job was to ensure
that the design conforms to existing housing policy, complies
with the acceptable planning, engineering, health, and
building standards, and that the scheme can be realized within
the budgetary framework imposed by the grant or loan. Once
approval has been granted, the Council would then be
responsible for implementing and maintaining this scheme (Jol,
1977).
The National Housing Authority was, at the time, a
technical and advisory body and was not an implementing
agency. Its principal functions were the approval of housing
schemes and approval of loans to local authorities from
government, parastatal, and private sources for local housing
schemes (Jol, 1977).
In short, central control was exercised during this
period through the Ministry of Local Government and Housing
which controlled the revenues for housing projects and the
National Housing Authority which gave final approval on
housing schemes.
2.2.2 THE LUSAKA PROJECT PERIOD:
During the planning stages of the Lusaka Upgrading and
Sites and Services Project central control became stronger and
more visible. A brief description of the planning and
implementation process of the Lusaka Project is as follows:
The National Housing Authority was responsible for the
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preparation of the project proposal as the City Council lacked
the technical capacity (Pasteur, 1979). As this was a
'demonstration' project, the World Bank was under pressure to
make it a success, and felt that the Council's poor record of
implementing previous sites and service projects would not
make them a suitable body for implementation. The reasons
given were that the Council's poor performance was a 'result
of inefficient internal bureaucratic procedures and a bias
towards conventional housing solutions' (Bamberger et al.,
1982:75). As such, the Housing Project Unit (HPU) was set up
as a semi-autonomous agency under the umbrella of the Lusaka
Council. The Project Unit was responsible for the
implementation of the project only; maintenance and cost
recovery were to be the responsibility of the Lusaka Council.
However, there is a history behind this decision. In the
preliminary discussions with the World Bank, it was decided,
probably at the Bank's insistence, that the implementation of
the project should be undertaken by a special project unit
rather than through the existing departmental structure of
either the Council or the National Housing Authority. The
project proposal, therefore, included the organizational
design and staffing for a project unit although its location
was not specified. It was assumed however, that this unit
would be connected to the National Housing Authority as they
were responsible for the preparation of the project proposal,
even though the project was first initiated by the Lusaka
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Council. This solution was preferred by the World Bank, and
the project would have been implemented this way had it not
been for the strong insistence of the Town Clerk. He argued,
and rightfully so, that the project unit should be connected
with the Council as it was the proper authority to undertake a
project of this nature since it was responsible for the
provision of housing and infrastructure. In addition, as it
was responsible for revenue collection in the city, it would
be more logical to have one body collect all local charges.
He also recognized that the Council did not have the staff
within its present establishment to undertake the project, so
he proposed the lifting of controls on staff limits imposed by
the Ministry of Local Government and Housing to allow the
Council to hire the necessary staff. What he had in mind was
'an innovative management structure under which a special
department of the Council would be free of the conventional
local government controls and procedures and would have the
flexibility to enable it to get things done' (Pasteur,
1979:24-25). In the end, his persistance convinced the World
Bank and the Town Clerk's paper containing the detailed
proposals for the organizational structure of the Housing
Project Unit was adopted (Pasteur, 1979). Figure 2
illustrates the organizational structure of the HPU in
relation to the City Council.
One cannot predict how successful the project might have
been had it been implemented under the jurisdiction of the
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Figure 2: Lusaka Upgrading and Sites and Services Project Organization: City Council,
Housing Project Unit, and Central Agencies. Source: Pasteur, 1979.
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National Housing Authority. Clearly, any outside agency would
have had more difficulty in getting the support of the
councillors and political leaders in the squatter settlements.
Also, the Council departments would have had to be involved,
and coordination with them would have been more difficult
(Pasteur, 1979). This is not to say that the Housing Project
Unit in its final form did not have any difficulties, but
rather that it would have faced more difficulties had it been
under the National Housing Authority.
The Housing Project Unit being functionally separated
from the Lusaka Council was able to achieve large-scale
shelter development in a fairly short time simply by bypassing
the municipal engineers and other people within the Council
who had pessimistic views of the project (Blair, 1983,
Pasteur, 1979 and Schlyter, 1984). However, various problems
arose during implementation. The most important of which were
the hand-over problems of cost recovery and maintenance, and
what to do with the Project Unit once the project is
completed.
The separation of responsibility for capital works
implementation by the Housing Project Unit and revenue
collection and maintenance by the Lusaka Council created much
confusion and misunderstanding. Since cost recovery began
before the project was completed, both the Council and Project
Unit were blaming one another for low cost recovery.
Therefore, the World Bank assigned the Project Unit the
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responsibility for collecting charges until the completion of
the capital project; then it will be handed over to the
Council (Sanyal, 1986a). The Project Unit did not achieve
better results and the rate of cost recovery is still poor.
However, this is due to other reasons which will be discussed
in the following section.
The issue of maintenance on the other hand, could not
easily be dealt with. Because the project sites have not been
maintained, the minimal infrastructure provided is quickly
deteriorating and giving justification to residents not to pay
(Bamberger et al., 1982 and Oestereich, 1986).
The problem of maintenance and hand-over in general
raises the question of why had the project not been
implemented by the regular departments of the Lusaka Council
in the first place thereby avoiding the problems of continuity
and effective hand-over. In addition, one might question the
wisdom of offering special privileges and higher salaries to
the Project Unit staff to attract the best people from both
the Council and the National Housing Authority, and the
consequential problems that this caused. The implementation of
the project by the existing Council departments would have
improved the management performance of the Council by
strengthening their capabilities in delivering projects and
improve coordination between the various departments. It
would also ensure replication of this project in the future.
On the other hand, this would have undoubtedly slowed the
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process, which the World Bank would not have agreed to. It
should be mentioned that the aim of the Bank in the 1970's was
to demonstrate the feasibility of projects rather than
institution building, which did not become an objective of the
Bank until later.
For sure, the model of the Housing Project Unit as a
special unit would have made further upgrading projects almost
impossible. This was dealt with by the Lusaka Council by
disbanding the Project Unit and creating a new unit within the
Council structure to take its place. The Peri-Urban Areas
Unit was created in the Department of Housing and Social
Services to coordinate activities in the project areas and to
initiate more upgrading activities, as shown in Figure 1. The
unit has retained the same management procedures and styles it
previously had in the Project Unit such as the field team
approach, the operation of the building materials stores, and
allocation of plots. In this way, the experience of the
Project Unit staff was retained within the Council to ensure
better implementation of future projects. In addition, it
would diminish the continuity and hand-over problems faced in
the Lusaka Project.
On the other hand, the Peri-Urban Areas Unit no longer
has the autonomy that the Project Unit had as it is strictly
controlled by the head of the Housing and Social Services
Department. Although the unit was responsible for the
implementation of the Kalingalinga Project, all pertinent
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decisions were made by the head of the department and only
towards the end of the project was total responsibility given
to the Unit. Undoubtedly, the operation of the Unit within
the larger framework of the Council has weakened it
considerably and unless it is given more support it may not
survive.
2.2.3 THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE LUSAKA PROJECT:
The Third National Development Plan (1979-1983) reverted
the responsibility for planning, design and execution of
housing projects back to local authorities, and limited the
role of the National Housing Authority to advising local
authorities (TNDP, 1979). Due to the economic difficulties,
the National Housing Authority's budget was considerably
reduced and it has now become self-financing by building
houses for sale.
Although the Lusaka Council has regained authority for
shelter provision, there remains one problem in the way the
Council deals with upgrading, which is the 'project' approach.
This approach tends to become a piecemeal solution and does
not have much impact on the city as a whole. A careful
analysis of the housing situation needs to be devised to give
an overall perspective of the problem and ensure a better
delivery system.
Another weakness of the Council is its maintenance
capabilities. This problem is not unique to the Lusaka
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Council but is inherent in most local governments in
developing countries. The solution is not an easy one as
decision makers lack understanding of the importance of
maintenance both technically, economically, and socially.
Available resources are usually spent on extending available
facilities rather than maintaining existing ones (Cohen,
1985). A solution to this problem in Lusaka requires training
and a new source of revenue which the Council neither has nor
is likely to get as will be discussed in the next section.
2.3 RAIS ING LOCAL REVENUE:
The Lusaka Council, as all urban councils in Zambia,
derive its funds locally through rents, fees, charges, taxes,
and commercial enterprise. Additional finance comes from
central government through grants and loans, although the
Council's main sources of revenue are generated locally
(Greenwood and Howell, 1980). Major services are financed out
of a number of funds or accounts such as:
- The general rate fund, which finances general urban
services. Its major source of revenue is mainly
property rates and a personal levy on all locally
employed persons; minor sources are licence fees,
fines, and income investment. In cases where the
revenue generated from this fund proved to be
insufficient, the central government has in the past
usually supplemented it with grants (Jol, 1977).
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- Trading accounts in water and sewerage are intended to
be self-financing as both operating and debt servicing
costs are met from user charges. The liquor account
is also self-financing and at times its revenues have
proved to be very profitable and the surplus was used
to finance a wide range of services, particularly
housing. However profits from liquor have been
steadily declining and there have been losses,
particularly in the mid 1970's (Greenwood and Howell,
1980 and Jol, 1977).
- Recurrent housing accounts are supposedly self-
financing through rents. Capital expenditure for new
housing is financed by loans and grants from central
government. Up to 50 percent of the capital cost of
any low income shelter scheme is met by a grant from
central government. In addition, interest rates on
official loans are low, implying a subsidy (Jol,
1977).
In a study relating the pattern of revenues and
expenditures of the Lusaka Council, it was found that revenues
from the general rate fund exceeded expenditures on general
urban services, user charges fell short of public utility
spending and grants from central government do not match
social services. Therefore, the pattern of expenditure does
not directly relate to the revenue source (Bahl and Linn,
1983).
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The central government, through the Ministry of
Decentralization, and previously through the Ministry of Local
Government and Housing, controls all local council finances.
Approvals must be granted annually by the ministry on all
capital and recurrent expenditure, regardless of the source or
size of the expenditure (Jol, 1977). Also, the Ministry
issues instructions on spending levels and priorities thereby
ensuring control over local councils (Greenwood and Howell,
1980).
In addition, central government retains control over all
price and rate levels. Local authorities have experienced
major constraints on the growth of revenue because of the
reluctance of central government to introduce higher charges.
The same applies to housing rents, which are determined by
central government. Liquor losses were also attributed in
part to price controls by central government over basic
commodities such as maize and beer (Greenwood and Howell,
1980).
One of the most serious problems that the Lusaka Council
continuously faces is the collection of revenue particularly
from rental housing. As Greenwood and Howell state '"rent-
dodging" is a minor art form in Zambia' (Greenwood and Howell,
1980:175). For example, arrears in the Lusaka Council were
estimated at 11 million Kwachas at the end of 1980, 43 percent
of which were water and sewerage. In 1979, it was estimated
that the seven largest local authorities in Zambia had a total
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deficit of K28 million on their housing accounts (Bamberger et
al., 1982).
The Lusaka Project which was intended to have full cost
recovery, in fact continues to have one of the lowest rates of
cost recovery among the 62 urban projects that the World Bank
has undertaken around the world. In 1978, the rate of default
was 65 percent in the upgraded areas and 42 percent in the
sites and service areas. Loan repayments were even worse as
the average rate of default was 85 percent in the upgraded
areas and 60 percent in the sites and service areas (Sanyal,
1986a).
The low rate of cost recovery in the Lusaka Project can
be attributed to two factors. The first is the Rent Act of
1972, imposed by central government, which made it very
difficult to evict renters for non-payment. As such, the
Lusaka Council had no firm basis on which to evict plot
holders. The second was the lack of political support for
enforcing eviction. Rates of default in public housing and
sites and service projects implemented prior to the Lusaka
Project were even higher. Despite this, no one had been
evicted and therefore, eviction could not be enforced on the
Lusaka Project areas only. In addition, local politicians
publicly announced their opposition to eviction so as to
generate political support for re-election (Sanyal, 1986a).
As such, the Council could not establish a satisfactory
rate of repayment for the Lusaka Project, and an enforcement
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on all areas of the city would have been politically unsound.
To sum up, the Lusaka Council generates most of its funds
locally, supplemented to the extent possible by central grants
and loans where necessary. Its weakness in generating
revenues is attributed to central controls that make it
virtually impossible for local authorities to enforce
sanctions for non-payment. It is also due to central controls
over prices and charges making it very difficult to raise
rents or fees without central approval. Finally, lack of
political will has also affected revenue collection. Without
central support, it is highly unlikely that the situation will
get better in the future.
2.4 THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SHELTER POLICIES:
A precondition for strengthening local government is the
existence of clearly stated national policies and guidelines
for the provision of shelter. Therefore, one needs to closely
look at Zambia's shelter policies to see whether they provide
the necessary guidelines for the provision of shelter for the
poor. Both the Second and Third National Development Plans
recognize the assets of informal settlements although they are
vague on implementation strategies. The policy of the Third
National Development Plan was to provide the maximum number of
families with at least the minimum shelter standards (TNDP,
1979). However, the plan does not indicate how this was to be
achieved as there were no clear strategies for implementation.
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Therefore, both plans are quite vague in their housing policy
(Schlyter, 1984). Bamberger, et al. go so far as to argue
that:
Zambia cannot really be said to have a national
housing policy. The plans, especially the Third
National Development Plan (1979-83), do contain
analyses of housing demand, but they lack a clear
articulation of a delivery system and of capacity
constraints, both of which are absolutely vital to
the planning of a national housing policy (Bamberger
et al., 1982:168).
The Lusaka Project was supported by the Bank on the basis
that it would demonstrate the feasibility of using upgrading
as a way of providing low cost shelter. The project was to
promote changes in shelter investments and initiate squatter
upgrading which would eventually be incorporated in Zambia's
national shelter policies (Bamberger et al., 1982).
Unfortunately, the World Bank has failed in this respect as no
national policies have yet had a clear strategy for doing
this. The Lusaka project was completed in 1982 and to date no
shelter policy has been developed that incorporates upgrading.
The government's apparent reliance on external funds for
the provision of shelter has, apart from the Kalingalinga
Project, not been successful either. At the first instance,
one can accept the reality of Zambia's economic crisis and the
lack of international funding as a logical explanation for the
government's failure to initiate shelter improvements for its
poor. However, one cannot overlook the regressive structure
of the subsidies that the government provides for housing.
Housing subsidies were introduced in 1964 to maintain a low
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rent structure, and were increased in 1968 as maintenance and
operation costs increased. Also, local councils were
instructed to provide a further subsidy from their liquor
surpluses. For example, the total annual subsidy for a low-
cost house in 1968 was K30 (K24 from central government and K6
from the Council) whereas actual rents charged ranged between
K50-100 per year (Jol 1977, and Martin 1979). By 1972,
recurrent subsidies accounted for 25 percent of the total
housing account revenues (Jol, 1977).
The Second National Development Plan proposed a home
ownership scheme whereby residents would be allowed to buy
their homes from the councils; it also introduced economic
rents for those who did not wish to buy. Annual increases in
rent were to take effect beginning 1973 so that by 1975 full
economic rents would be collected. At the same time, the
government would correspondingly reduce its subsidies with
their eventual removal by 1975 (Jol, 1977).
However, what in fact happened was that subsidies were
removed but rents were not increased, and the home ownership
programme never gained popular support. This resulted into
overall deficits on a number of the councils' accounts. To
make matters worse, the problem of arrears increased during
that period with the introduction of the Rent Act of 1972,
making it much easier for residents to dodge rent (Jol, 1977).
Consequently, the government had no choice but to reintroduce
the subsidies. Furthermore, it introduced a new subsidy in
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1975 that aimed at encouraging home ownership by allocating
allowances to homeowners.
The Third National Development Plan, once again raised
the issue of housing subsidies, which were estimated at 15-20
percent of the government's employees basic salaries. This
percentage is considerably higher for parastatal and private
company employees (TNDP). In 1978, it was estimated that
approximately 44 percent of all housing subsidies to public
sector employees were received by the 10 percent with the
highest incomes, while the poorest 30 percent received only
1.8 percent of the total subsidies. The poorest 50 percent of
workers received only 10 percent of the subsidies (Bamberger
et al., 1982).
The Third National Development Plan reiterated the
government's support for home ownership and suggested the
removal of subsidies and rechannelling the funds to low income
shelter provision (TNDP, 1979). The home ownership programme
seems to be picking up momentum, but unfortunately the
question of subsidies remains unchanged due to lack of
political support.
The adverse effects of these subsidies on the provision
of shelter for the poor cannot be overlooked. According to an
estimate done in the late 1970's these subsidies were
estimated at between K90-100 million annually (ILO, 1981a and
b). Such a large amount could go a long way in improving the
shelter conditions of the poor.
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Chapter Three
SHELTER COMPONENTS
The provision of shelter entails more than just building
or improving a house, but rather encompasses a multitude of
activities such as -land acquisition, location, availability of
affordable building materials, provision of infrastructure and
services, and finance. Each of these elements is provided by
different bodies making the eventual attainment of shelter a
difficult and cumbersome process, particularly to the poor who
spend most of their time earning enough money to survive.
The provision of infrastructure and services requires
coordination between various bodies, either public or private,
national or local, which can at times lead to problems.
Building codes and standards often dictate the use of
expensive materials making them unaffordable to low income
families. Land tenure is yet another essential component as
people are not willing to invest in shelter without some
security of tenure. Self-help programmes and community
participation can facilitate the provision of shelter. But
finally, without housing finance very little can be attained.
The aim of this chapter is to look at the various
components of shelter to identify the problems that are faced
with each one. For each of these components, an attempt will
be made to identify who deals with this issue, whether local
or central government and how effective they have been. The
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purpose is to identify who is more suited to act as a
facilitator of this component. Also, an attempt will be made
to see how these components have affected the provision of
shelter in Lusaka.
3.1 LAND TENURE:
A high proportion of the urban poor occupy land that they
do not own nor do they have the owner's permission to reside
there. Squatting has become a common way of meeting the
demand of low income families for shelter who very often rent
out rooms as an additional source of income (Doebele, 1982).
Public action with respect to land has mostly been to avoid
the issue altogether and opt for easier solutions. For
example, in sites and services projects, public land had been
used in most cases thereby avoiding the problems of land
acquisition and expropriation. In the slum upgrading schemes,
the land issue has mostly been avoided (Angel et al., 1983).
The reason that land has become a major obstacle in the
provision of shelter for the poor is that the issue is
political and institutional rather than a technical one.
Procurement of land involves negotiation, legislation, and
possibly confrontation. In addition, most politicians
consider the provision of land for the poor as a temporary
measure which will eventually be vacated for more profitable
use (Angel et al., 1983). Politicians fail to see that the
poor need to be housed somewhere and that this problem sooner
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or later must be confronted.
Also, governments face a dilemma in the land issue. For
one thing they realize that mass eviction can lead to
political unrest while at the same time they cannot deny the
landowners' right to their land. As such, it would appear
that governments need to find a compromise between the poor
who are in need of shelter and therefore land, or at least the
use of the land, and the landowner who wants economic gains
(Angel et al., 1983).
There is also the argument of the use of prime
agricultural land. In Egypt, for example, where only 4
percent of the total land area is arable, more than 10 percent
of this agricultural land has been lost to urban sprawl in the
last 30 years, mostly in the form of illegal squatting or
subdivision. The same applies to Lima where in ten years
(1965-1975) more than 14,000 hectares of irrigated land has
been lost to urban functions (Blitzer et al., 1981).
The provision of tenure to squatter settlements offers
two advantages: the first gives squatters security and as a
result provides incentives for squatters to improve the
quality of their housing. It has been shown that people only
invest in their housing if they are ensured some form of
security (Rodwin and Sanyal, 1987). In Turkey, for example,
once the government stopped the demolition of gecekondu
(squatter) settlements and accepted their existence, dwellings
were built less rapidly and to higher standards while older
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dwellings were improved and enlarged, and once public services
were provided the gecekondus were barely distinguishable from
other low income areas (Danielson and Keles, 1985). Security
of tenure in the squatter settlements of Bogota also led to
the rapid increase in the quality of housing (Burns and
Ferguson, 1987). As Burns and Ferguson pointed out, 'the
degree of property rights needed to achieve a perception of
security varies with culture and circumstance' (Burns and
Ferguson, 1987:30). The second advantage is that it enables
the government to collect property taxes and charge for the
provision and use of public services (Burns and Ferguson,
1987).
Clearly the issue of land is a local one, since local
authorities control land use, zoning, cadastral surveys, etc..
As such, local government needs to devise ways of providing
land tenure to the poor. However, they need strong national
policies that can facilitate land acquisition. Access to land
can take a variety of forms, such as government procurement of
land, opening up new tracts of land, or simply the
encouragement of owners to rent rooms, among others. Each of
these alternatives has its own advantages and disadvantages
and only local government can decide what is more suitable to
its local conditions.
One of the problems of developing countries is that land
expropriation is costly and time consuming due to outdated and
inefficient legislature. Doebele proposes the method of
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'quick-taking', such as that used in the United States and
most European countries, as a solution whereby governments get
access to the land at once while negotiations for a price
continue (Doebele, 1982).
Another method used in most socialist countries is the
separation of ownership of the structures from ownership of
the land. The advantages of this system is that it makes land
more affordable and private funds could be diverted towards
investment in structure, while giving the state the rights to
the increments in land values. This may have great advantages
in large sites and services projects and upgrading schemes
(Doebele, 1982). In Tanzania and the Sudan, for example,
public ownership of land has facilitated the provision of land
to the poor and has greatly reduced the needs of low income
groups (Blitzer et al., 1981).
Central governments' role in the land issue will mainly
be to give legislative power to local government to produce an
effective urban land policy (Blitzer et al., 1981). Any
significant change in land policies is likely to attract
attention and therefore, cannot take place unless it is widely
supported by the major centres of power (Angel et al., 1983).
Central governments need to encourage local government in its
land policies and to provide incentives for the them to do so.
Local governments face a difficult task as there are
numerous problems to be confronted. For example, how does one
ensure that once tenure had been given to the poor that the
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higher income groups will not displace them. Also, how can
local government ensure that the provision of tenure will not
encourage further squatting (Angel, 1983).
Angel argues that although the land issue is political
and requires political action, its implementation is not
easily attainable. Tenure rights require a certain
administrative machinery that may not be available in
developing countries (Angel, 1983). Zambia, in theory, has
public ownership of land and therefore, problems associated
with land should be minimal. This change occurred in 1975
under the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975 which vested
all land ownership in the President. Under this act all
freehold rights to land have been abolished, and tenure was
converted to leasehold. Land has no value except for the
value of improvements as leases are charged at standard rates
per hectare regardless of variations in quality (Dewar et al.,
1982 and Pasteur, 1979).
Another major legislation concerning land in Zambia is
the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act of 1974
passed specifically for upgrading and sites and service areas.
This act allows for occupancy leases up to 99 years in sites
and service areas and occupancy licenses of up to 30 years in
upgraded areas. Previously, sites and service areas had a 10
year tenure term which was not backed by any legislation.
Land acquisition in Zambia should not present any
problems as freehold rights to land have been abolished,
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tenure converted to leasehold, and land is regarded as having
no value apart from the value of improvements. However, the
administrative procedures required for such a change have been
difficult and complicated. In the Lusaka Project, land
acquisition was one of the major problems that it faced and
caused delays of up to three years in some sites. Most
matters concerning land were, and still are, dealt with
nationally through the Commissioner of Lands, who is
responsible for acquisition and transfer procedures (Bamberger
et al., 1982 and Pasteur, 1979). Land valuation is the
responsibility of the Regional Valuation Office of the
Ministry of Local Government and Housing and compensation
payments are paid by central government through this ministry
(Pasteur, 1979). The occupancy licence for sites and service
and upgrading, however, is issued and administered by the
Lusaka Council (Angel, 1983 and Pasteur, 1979).
At the outset of the project, the Housing Project Unit
transferred matters of land acquisition to the Commissioner of
Lands. As the Commissioner's office was responsible for all
land transfers in Zambia, it was under considerable pressure
and had limited staff. It did not give the Lusaka Project any
priority and proceeded with it at normal pace. Approval for
acquisition had to be obtained from both the Permanent
Secretary and the Minister of Local Government and Housing,
and then submitted to the President for approval, causing
further delays. In addition, the properties had to be
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verified with the Registrar of Titles causing more delays as
some sites were found to be parts of larger properties that
have been subdivided but not registered. These subdivisions
had to surveyed and there was only one registered land
surveyor in Lusaka. Also, the sites had to be valued by the
Valuation Officer so that compensation could be paid for the
land. This again was another bottleneck as this office is
responsible for all land valuation in Zambia.
After one year, the Project Unit realized that the matter
of land acquisition was taking considerable time and decided
to take matters into its own hands. It tried to purchase land
by direct negotiation. However, owners were not willing to
sell at the valuation prices and generally resisted selling.
It also used the device of powers of entry under the Land
Conversion Act which allowed entry for the purpose of
constructing roads.
This is an example of how difficult administrative
procedures can be. In part this was due to the newness of the
legislation and the inexperience of staff with it. It is also
due to the centralized procedure where all land in Zambia is
handled by one office. And finally lack of trained staff
contributed to these delays. A system where issues related to
land are handled locally and within one agency that deals with
valuation, surveying, title, and registry would simplify land
acquisition and registry of deeds.
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3.2 PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND SOCIAL SERVICES:
The provision of infrastructure and social services for
shelter of the urban poor requires the provision of essential
and/or minimal services such as water, waste disposal and
transportation. Provision of minimal infrastructure and
services are essential for the success of these programmes and
it is a positive way of showing government support for them.
The problem with the provision of services is that it
encompasses a wide range of functions including but not
necessarily limited to water supply, sewerage, drainage, waste
disposal, roads, electricity and street lighting. Health and
education also need to be considered. Each of these
activities is carried out by a different unit, some private
some public, some national while others are local. The
priorities of these units are different and coordination
between all of them is very difficult. For example, in
Valencia, Venezuela, water is in the hands of a national
government agency, road building a responsibility of both the
state of Carabob and the Ministry of Public Works.
Electricity is provided by two agencies, one national and the
other private. Health is controlled by the Ministry of Health
and the Venezuela Institute of Social Security, while
education is a responsibility of the central government. The
local government is in charge of only sanitation and street
maintenance. If anything is to be done in the city, the city
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council must petition to the state or national agencies.
Local government is virtually powerless to make any decisions
since most of these are made centrally (Gilbert and Ward,
1985).
In Bogota, Colombia, on the other hand, the local
authorities are in charge of electricity, water, drainage,
telephones, local roads, and waste disposal. In fact, most
activities are planned and carried out locally in the local
planning department and housing corporation (Gilbert and Ward,
1985). Therefore, matters of coordination are considerably
reduced.
Some cities may have a considerable degree of autonomy
whereas others are completely dependent on the central
government for the provision of services. If a service is
seen to contribute to national growth and industrialization,
the state usually intervenes with the aim of facilitating
these services to the industrial sector and leaving the
remaining services such as waste disposal to local
authorities. It is widely known that without a good
infrastructure system, industry cannot function and therefore,
productivity cannot be increased, and economic growth cannot
be accelerated. As such, the national government has used the
argument of economic development for intervention in the
provision of services leaving the non-economic services to
local authorities. As Gilbert and Ward argue:
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While all [services] are provided to the population
for social reasons, we would propose that they have
been developed primarily not because of organized
political pressure from residential groups but as a
response to the organized statement of needs from
powerful industrial and commercial interests. In
general, it has been in those areas of critical
interest to industry and commerce where services
have expanded not in areas which have been primarily
subject to growing working-class or even middle-
class pressure. (Gilbert and Ward, 1985:132,
emphasis in original)
Most large cities in developing countries, now have a
fairly adequate infrastructure system for industrial and
economic growth but lack these services in the poor areas
where the labour required to run this industry resides. It is
also widely known that a healthy work force is more productive
than an unhealthy one. Therefore, it seems quite apparent
that these services need to be provided to residential areas
particularly those of the poor.
Also, public (and private) utility agencies operating at
the national level are not always sympathetic to the needs of
the poor. For instance, 'pricing and management rules of
public utilities may unnecessarily restrict the access of the
poor to public services at reasonable cost. High installation
charges, for example, may be incompatible with income levels
of the poor. Rules of financial management restrict overall
supply' (54 Grimes, 1976:87).
In Zambia, the provision of services is relatively easier
to deal with as the local urban authorities provide a wide
range of services, with no overlapping responsibilities making
coordination relatively easier. Table 3 outlines the
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responsibilities for the various urban functions.
The minimal services required for squatter improvements
in Zambia are essentially the provision of water, sewerage,
waste collection, roads and street lighting. In both the
Lusaka and Kalingalinga projects, electricity was not
provided. Therefore, the coordination that is required was
mainly that within the departments of the Lusaka Council, and
this has not previously caused undue delays nor were many
difficulties encountered in the past. Almost every person in
Lusaka has access to piped water. So the problems with water
now concerns the distance at which water taps are available,
the number of families using the tap, the frequency of
breakdowns, wastage, and payment. Of the essential services
provided by the central government, (transport, health and
education), transport has been a major problem. The United
Bus Company of Zambia has for some time been facing serious
financial difficulties making the expansion of bus routes
almost impossible, and residents have to rely on private taxis
and minibuses for transportation and have had to pay higher
prices.
On the other hand, there is a fundamental problem with
maintenance. The services provided in the Lusaka Project have
quickly deteriorated and broken down because of lack of
maintenance (Oestereich, 1986). In an effort to solve this
problem the community leaders have been given the
responsibility of maintenance in the Kalingalinga Project, but
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Table 3: Responsibilities of Urban Functions in Lusaka
Function Central Lusaka National
Ministries Council Parastatals
Basic Infrastructure:
Water Supply PDEMR
Sewerage PDEM
Fire Services PDEM
Electricity R Zambia Electricity
Supply Corporation
(ZESCO): PDEM
Waste Disposal PDEM
Street Lighting PDEM
Communications & Transport:
Telephone PDEMR
Main Roads PDE M
Other Roads PDEM
Bus Services United Bus Company of
Zambia (UBZ): PDEM
Taxi & Mini-bus Services(a)
Housing & Sites:
Public Housing PD DEM
Sites & Services PD DEM
Housing Loans P M
Upgrading P PDEM
Land Tiles P M
Health Services:
Curative Health (hospitals &
health centres) PEM
Preventive Health (clinics) PEM
Cemetaries PDEM
Education:
Pre-School PM
All Others PM
Community Development
& Welfare:
Community Centre PDEM
Amenities & Recreation:
Parks & Gardens PDEM
Sports & Recreation PDEM
Liquor Brewery & Taverns PDEM
Trade & Control Promotion:
Trading Licences P M
Markets PDEM
Public Order & Law
Enforcement:
Police PM
Town Planning & Control:
Local Planning PD P
Building Control M
Land Administration PDM
(a) Private owned and operated.
Key: P= Policy and Planning
D= Design
E= Execution
M= Operational Management
R= Revenue Collection
Source: Compiled from Greenwood and Howell, 1980, and Muller, 1979. 6 3
it is still too soon to tell whether this method is more
effective or whether it could be successfully implemented in
the other areas.
The lask of maintenance can be attributed to the fact
that local authorities have since independence embarked on
development projects for the extension of services such as
water, sewage, roads and street lighting. As these services
expanded, the amount of maintenance necessary also increased
and has become a burden in terms of finance and manpower. In
addition, local authorities have extended services to the
"African areas" that were not previously serviced during the
colonial days. Finally with the expansion of Lusaka and the
incorporation of the squatter areas, services had to also be
provided there. All these require maintenance but the Council
has not increased its capacity to maintain these areas
(Greenwood and Howell, 1980).
3.3 BUILDING CODES AND REGULATIONS:
Building codes, standards, and regulations were devised
with the aim of ensuring certain health and safety criteria.
These may include fire prevention, structural safety, public
health, as well as certain aesthetic requirements. However,
there are numerous reasons for the ineffectiveness of these
standards, mainly:
- Standards are not based on local conditions and
experiences but have either been inherited from the
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colonial days or imported from developed countries.
- Standards do not reflect the availability or lack of
local resources. The high demand for shelter affects
these resources by first use of national resources
such as timber, soil, and minerals, and second, by the
use of agricultural land for building construction.
- Standards often do not reflect local cultures,
traditions and living patterns and this has a direct
impact on the poor.
- Since standards are based on Western models, the
technology involved is therefore inappropriate. Very
often capital intensive mass production or
prefabrication is used in the provision of low cost
housing.
- Standards do not reflect the local economic situation
and are not based on the capacity of the people and
governments to pay for shelter.
- Since standards are supposed to be enforced by local
government, who very often are weak and ineffectual,
it is very difficult to enforce them, except in the
cases of upper and upper-middle income housing.
- Standards reflect social stratification since
dwellings reflect a certain socio-economic status
(Mabogunje et al., 1978).
Also, many of these building and sanitary codes are based
on codes developed in the nineteenth century before the
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discovery of disease prevention and control methods (Oram,
1979). Nowadays, it is believed that basic services are an
adequate way of preventing diseases and ensuring health
standards. These basic services usually include clean water,
disposal of human waste by simple methods such as the use of
pit latrines, and simple adequate methods of waste disposal.
Similarly, shelter need only satisfy a few basic or minimum
standards such as shelter from the elements both physical and
natural (Oram, 1979 and Turner, 1968). In warmer climates,
this requirement can be met by very simple construction
methods. Shelter need only to be structurally stable and
should provide adequate space to prevent overcrowding.
Finally, restrictions on the number of persons to an unit
deprives the poor from a source of income. In many sites and
service schemes, participants are prohibited from renting
rooms in their dwellings thereby eliminating an important
source of income. In Bogota, for example, studies indicate
that about one-third of barrio residents rent out rooms
receiving about one-fifth of their income from this source
(Vernaz, 1973 as cited in Doebele, 1982).
Given all the above, it seems logical that local
government would be more suited to review its building codes
and regulations and adopt codes that suit local conditions.
Only local government can understand local conditions and
people's needs. Standards should be developed to reflect
people's real needs and not a 'middle class-technocratic
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perception of what these needs are' (Mabogunje et al.,
1978:15). Local government should aim at developing standards
that ensure the health and safety criteria mentioned above;
can be easily attained particularly by small construction
activities; and finally, they should be affordable by the
majority of households (Blitzer et al., 1981).
Most standards are developed to serve the whole
population, but in effect they have benefitted only the upper
classes (Mabogunje et al., 1978). However, there are a few
exceptions. In both Tanzania and the Sudan, lower income
families had better access to land and shelter because
standards were kept very low; in certain urban areas in the
Sudan, no standards are imposed (Blitzer et al., 1981).
Consequently, codes that would permit the use of inexpensive,
locally made materials would not only be more accessible to
the poor but would also promote the local building materials
industry.
Zambia adopted the building codes and sanitation
standards from the British (Schlyter, 1984). These standards
were previously applied in the European areas of the city
only, while in the African areas no standards were enforced
(Schlyter and Schlyter, 1979). After independence, local
authorities tried to enforce these stringent standards in all
formal areas of Lusaka, except the sites and service schemes,
by applying them to all new construction and attempting to
upgrade most low-income housing. The effect of this was the
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adoption of industrialized building systems which were very
capital intensive and had a large import content (ILO, 1981b).
In the 1960's, when the government first introduced its
sites and service prograne, modified standards were
introduced. These included narrower streets, smaller plot
sizes, and minimal sanitary requirements. The Lusaka Council
continuously reduced these standards with each new sites and
service project due to high costs and lack of affordability by
the target groups. As such, minimal adjustments in standards
were required for the sites and services component of the
Lusaka Project.
However there were no standards available for upgrading
areas and this caused considerable debate about the
appropriate level of services. The World Bank wanted to reduce
standards considerably to reduce costs. The city engineers,
however, felt that the same standards applied elsewhere in the
city should also apply to project areas, and were reluctant to
accept lower standards (Schlyter, 1984). In the end, the
engineers reluctantly accepted the lower standards.
It should be mentioned at this point, that there is a
certain trade-off that one makes when reducing standards.
Minimal standards reduce capital costs considerably, while
increasing the costs of maintenance. This is an important
point that needs to be considered particularly in Lusaka where
maintenance has always been a problem. In Lusaka, it may have
been more logical in the long run to accept higher standards
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and their ultimate high costs, to ensure a longer life cycle.
This matter needs careful consideration to ensure that costs
are not too high yet at the same time maintenance is at a
minimal level.
Although Third National Development Plan adopted the
minimal shelter standards 'to be extended to as many of those
existing households not enjoying these standards as possible'
(TNDP, 1979:322), politicians and administrators continue to
oppose lower standards. They reluctantly accepted the lower
standards in the Lusaka Project due to the fear of a cholera
epidemic and continue to consider upgrading as merely an
emergency measures. In the eyes of politicians in Zambia,
upgraded areas are 'still just muddy compounds', and are not
showpieces that offer political display (Schlyter, 1984).
3.4 HOUSING FINANCE:
There is no doubt that finance plays an important role in
the provision of shelter. However, most developing countries
lack adequate or well-developed housing finance systems, or
when they do exist they tend to exclude between 70-80 percent
of the population because of their high eligibility
requirements. Most housing finance schemes require that
persons have a certain level of income, have steady dependable
employment, and have some form of collateral. All these
requirements tend to exclude the poor from access to finance.
The poor, by definition, are usually below the minimum income
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level required for eligibility for loans, and neither have the
assets nor the collateral that enables them to borrow money
(Sanyal, 1986b and UN, 1979). Also, they are constrained by
the fact that they cannot afford high mortgage payments and
very often lack steady incomes as their earnings tend to
fluctuate making it very difficult to meet regular payments
demanded by such loans.
In response to this, most governments in developing
countries, created national housing banks aimed at providing
credit to lower income groups who have been excluded from
private sector financing. However, in reality, these banks
are only slightly more effective than the private sector since
the same requirements, albeit less stringent, still apply.
The income eligibility requirement, although lower than the
private sector, still was not low enough for low income
households. In addition, there is no flexibility for income
fluctuation and small repayments.
As such, there is a need for redefining the eligibility
requirements to make them more accessible to the urban poor.
This can be done in many ways such as reinterpreting the
collateral required for security of loans, offering small
short-term repetitive loans and making flexible repayment
schedules. In addition, an effort could be made at locating
financial institutions in residential areas of the poor to
facilitate physical access (UN, 1979).
Clearly, financial institutions must be large enough to
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be able to provide loans to the majority of the poor.
Therefore, to be effective they must be national institutions
supported and guaranteed by central governments. Central
government must take the necessary steps to develop financial
institutions capable of providing credit for housing
construction and to incorporate these institutions with the
national financial system.
At the same time, local government could strengthen the
capacity of the poor in obtaining loans for housing. This
could be done in the form of building material loans whereby
in-kind loans are granted to those wishing to build or upgrade
there dwellings.
In Zambia, financial institutions offering credit for
housing did not develop until recently. This could be
attributed to the non-existence of a private market for
housing at the time. Currently there are a number of
financial institutions that offer such credit such as the
Zambia National Building Society, the Local Authorities
Superannuation Fund, the Zambia National Provident Fund, as
well as private institutions. In addition, building material
loans are usually provided in designated project areas.
Most of these financial institutions, however, have
geared their lending towards upper income groups. In the
Lusaka Project, the building materials loan was crucial to the
success of the project as most families did not appear to have
access to other sources of finance. Those that were eligible
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for loans from the Zambia National Provident Fund were unaware
that this source was available (Bamberger et al., 1982).
Eligible families may make one withdrawal from this fund to
which they have annually contributed part of their wages as a
4 percent savings for retirement plan. Project participants
may receive these funds in the form of a loan certificate
which is accepted as in-kind payment at local materials stores
(UN, 1979). This was virtually the only alterative source for
the Lusaka Project participants, as banks were reluctant to
give loans because of their low income status (Bamberger et
al., 1982).
The Third National Development Plan estimated that over
90 percent of non-governmental housing finance is utilized in
financing private high cost and company owned housing. The
Plan, realizing the importance of housing finance requested
institutions to change their policies to provide private
borrowers, particularly lower income group, access to credit
(TNDP, 1979). Unfortunately this has not been so successful.
The Zambia National Building Society, as a policy, at present
does not extend credit for an amount less than 5000 Kwachas,
which must be paid back in five years. Therefore, a person
must earn a minimum of K200 per month to be eligible (whereas
low income families earn between K40-100 monthly). In
addition, the Zambia National Building Society does not accept
the occupancy licenses and leasehold titles for mortgage
purposes (Sanyal, 1980). As such, low income families have
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relatively little access to finance in Lusaka.
3.5 SELF-HELP PROGRAMMES AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION:
Sites and services and upgrading schemes are not only
less expensive per unit than public housing, but they are more
appropriate particularly if the local communities take an
active role in these schemes. Local government can be more
effective than central government in encouraging and
supporting self-help programmes that allow communities and
neighbourhood groups to decide on their shelter needs and
improve their own living conditions (Rondinelli, 1986). Local
government should aim at working with the people rather than
for them. More active dialogue between local government and
local communities leads to better understanding of their needs
by local government while, at the same time, leads to better
understanding of local government limitations by the
communities.
In Zambia, the United National Independence Party (UNIP)
has been very influential in organizing self-help activities.
In addition to its political functions, it undertakes social
and economic responsibilities. This is most prominent in the
squatter areas where the Party allocates plots, controls
building activities, particularly commercial ones, organizes
self-help water supply projects and maintains wells, builds
clinics, schools and markets, as well as maintaining law and
order (Pasteur, 1979). Pasteur maintains that the Party has
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been very strong in squatter settlements for three main
reasons:
First, being illegal settlements, there is a need
for organisation to defend their interests against
authority. Secondly, since central and local
government have bee virtually uninvolved in the
areas, there is a need to provide as far as feasible
for rudimentary urban services and controls. The
party's achievements in filling this vacuum, while
not an adequate substitute for services, have still
been remarkable, and in a very real sense the party
organisation has acted as the local authority.
Thirdly, from the point of view of national
leadership the party control provides the best means
of excercising tight security and social control
over the mass of lower-income population, and of
maintaining support for the Government (Pasteur,
1979:11).
In both the Lusaka and Kalingalinga projects, the Party
was very influential in mobilizing popular participation,
briefing participants, organizing self-help activities, and
participating in decisions about road layout (Bamberger et
al., 1982). However the party leaders have not welcomed the
help of the community development staff of the Council due to
fear of rivalry.
Given this high degree of community organization in
Lusaka, it seems obvious that every effort should be made to
encourage these communities to help themselves.
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Chapter Four
CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to analyze the Lusaka Urban
District Council's performance in the provision of housing
with the intention of making certain generalizations about
local government participation in shelter. Obviously one
cannot reach generalizable conclusions from the experience of
one country but, on the other hand, the Lusaka Council's long
experience in housing provision is an experience that can be
learned from. The aim of this chapter is to summarize the
findings and attempt to draw some conclusions about the pre-
requisite conditions under which local governments can
effectively carry out shelter programmes and to identify the
roles of both central and local government in the provision of
shelter.
In Zambia, the government is the main supplier of housing
as a formal private market did not develop until recently.
This undoubtedly has put tremendous pressures on all levels of
government, as well as on the national parastatals for the
provision of housing.
Some general points can be made with respect to the roles
of both local and central government in Lusaka in the
provision of shelter. Central governments main
responsibilities have been:
- Production of national housing policies based upon an
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analysis of housing needs but have generally lacked
clear implementation strategies.
- The development of financial institutions for housing
finance. However, the government has not been
successful in directing the lending policies of these
institutions towards lower income groups.
- The provision of loans and grants to the Lusaka
Council for housing programmes.
- Setting the amount that local authorities can charge
for rents and setting fees and charges for urban
services.
- Adoption of minimal standards for shelter provision.
- Finally, with respect to land, it has provided
adequate legislation to facilitate housing provision.
However, as all matters relating to land are handled
at the central level, administrative procedures have
tended to frustrate implementation at the local level.
The Lusaka Council, on the other hand, has had the
following responsibilities:
- Design and execution of housing programmes, although
there have been times when the central government has
taken the responsibility of design such as in the
Lusaka Project.
- Provision of essential services such as water,
sewerage, roads and so on.
- Working with communities in the execution of shelter
76
projects.
- Collection of all fees, rents and charges.
- Maintenance of all public housing stock.
It seems that in Lusaka, the weakness of the Council in
delivering improved shelter for low income families is not a
direct result of inefficient management nor lack of technical
capability, but rather mainly a result of central government
control and interference. Central control over price levels,
rents and charges has limited the ability of the Council's
revenue raising capacity and made it reliant on central
financial support. Also, the fact that the Council is
powerless in imposing sanctions for non-payment of rents,
again due to central policies, has weakened its revenue base.
The main weaknesses within the Lusaka Council could be
summarized as follows:
- The Council's poor performance in maintenance has
serious implications on not only shelter schemes but
on the city as a whole. Solving the maintenance
problem requires the existence of a organizational
structure capable of planning and monitoring routine
and periodic maintenance; a set of maintenance
standards against which performance targets are based;
availability of spare parts; and adequate revenues for
recurrent expenditures.
- With respect to shelter, the Council's approach to
upgrading and sites and services continues to be
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project oriented. Although this has been common
practice everywhere, one wonders whether an overall
approach might not be more feasible whereby services
are gradually introduced to all slums and squatter
settlements, rather than concentrate resources on one
area. Further research and experimentation in this
field is needed.
Finally, in the absence of strong policy guidelines from
central government, and given its inability to remove or
reduce subsidies and rechannel funds to the poor, it seems
unlikely that the Council would be successful in delivering
marked improvements to squatter settlements.
The objectives of this thesis are to draw inferences from
the experience of the Lusaka Council with the aim of
identifying the circumstances under which local authorities
can effectively produce a shelter programme for the poor; and
to redefine the roles of both central and local government in
the provision of shelter. The Lusaka case indicates that for
effective local government participation in shelter the
following pre-conditions should be available:
- A comprehensive shelter policy must be established at
the national level. Housing policies should
anticipate problems and should aim at preventing them
from occurring rather than waiting for the problem to
become so acute that a sensible approach is no longer
possible and piece-meal actions need to be taken to
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cope with the urgent demands (Karnjanaprakorn et al.).
Housing policies should provide clear guidelines to
both the central and local levels; for both the
private and public sectors; and indicate how much aid
local authorities can expect from central government
and how much needs to be raised locally.
- the provision of a set of laws and regulations to
support national policies. Land policies, for
example, require strong central support as any major
change can attract attention and may be unpopular.
- Due to the economic problems that most developing
countries are facing it would seem logical for central
governments to reduce subsidies for middle and upper
income groups and reallocate them to the poor. In
Lusaka, for example, subsidies which were intended to
help low income families have in fact benefitted upper
income groups. As such, central governments need to
review this policy and either remove subsidies
altogether or to rechannel them to those most in need
of them. However, there are certain political
implications in such a move. Attempts to remove
subsidies, particularly on basic commodities, have
generally not been well received by the public and has
often led to rioting. As such, any removal or
reduction of subsidies requires careful analysis.
- The removal of all controls over prices, rents, and
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charges and to give local authorities the power to
increase charges and rents.
- Finally, local authorities need to have the freedom to
enforce sanctions against non-payment of rents,
charges, fees and taxes.
In redefining the roles of both central and local
government, it seems clear from Lusaka's case that the central
government's role, in addition to ensuring the availability of
the above conditions, should be limited to the following:
- Encouraging local governments to be more autonomous
and where necessary, provide them with the legal
authority to undertake more responsibilities. In
Lusaka, the Council has lost considerable autonomy due
to central interference and decentralization efforts
have not been successful.
- Where necessary they should provide financial and/or
technical assistance to local governments to carry out
their shelter programmes. This however does not imply
that local governments should depend solely on
national funds for their programmes but rather to
complement them with funds raised locally. The Lusaka
Council seems to have the technical capacity for
planning and execution of shelter programmes but
clearly lacks the finance to do so.
- Establishing or encouraging the development of
financial institutions for shelter purposes. Housing
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finance plays an important role in the provision of
housing, and the central government must take the
necessary steps to develop financial institutions
capable of providing credit for housing construction;
to guarantee these institutions; and to incorporate
them within the national financial system. In Zambia,
financial institutions providing small loans for low
income groups are virtually non-existent and steps
should be taken in that direction.
- Assisting local governments in expanding their revenue
raising capabilities and to use these resources to
provide and maintain services. As previously
mentioned, the Lusaka Council's inability to raise
revenues has been due to a large extent to central
regulations and laws.
- Assisting local government in improving their
technical, administrative and organizational
capabilities to deliver urban services.
- Also, in cases where infrastructure and social
services are centrally provided either to decentralize
these services or to ensure that they are provided.
The provision of basic services by the Lusaka Council
seems to have minimized coordination problems and has
facilitated the provision of these services to low
income groups.
Local governments, on the other hand, need to evaluate
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local conditions and to understand shelter requirements.
Local authorities need to act as facilitators, managers and
encouragers of shelter activities. To be effective local
governments need to widen their scope from 'project level' and
to act as a coordinating body that ensures effective capacity
to perform functions. The main issues that local authorities
need to consider are:
- Review building codes and regulations and adopt codes
that suit local conditions. Codes that permit the use
of inexpensive, locally made materials would not only
be more accessible to the poor but would also promote
the local building materials industry.
- Encourage and support self-help programmes that allow
communities and neighbourhood groups to decide on
their shelter needs and improve their own living
conditions.
- Provide essential and/or minimal services such as
water, waste disposal, sewerage and so on.
- Also, local authorities need to devise ways for
recipients to pay for these services without too much
burden on their scarce resources.
- Provide land tenure to ensure a perception of
security.
It seems clear that the redefinition of roles and
responsibilities of both central and local governments
requires institution building to enable local authorities to
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take on these increased responsibilities. It also requires
the training of local government personnel, particularly in
the areas of financial management, operation and maintenance,
needs and demand analysis, and investment planning. Finally,
for effective shelter programmes, there is a need to work
within existing institutions and to improve them rather than
replace them on the grounds of efficiency. The creation of
the Housing Project Unit for the implementation of the Lusaka
Project was successful in the sense that it provided large
scale shelter improvement in a fairly short time. However, to
a certain extent, it weakened the Lusaka Council by depleting
it of staff and did not provide the opportunity for improving
the effectiveness of the Council itself.
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